long article about EU legislation vs. extrateritorriality of US FISA etc. rules

[D. Hugh Redelmeier]

| From: Christopher Browne <cbbrowne-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w at public.gmane.org>

| On Mon, Jun 24, 2013 at 2:58 PM, Ken Heard <kenslists-R6A+fiHC8nRWk0Htik3J/w at public.gmane.org> wrote:
| 
| > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Good for you using PGP, shaming all us lazy ones.

| > D. Hugh Redelmeier wrote:

| > > Oh: and don't use the cloud.
| >
| > Not even the open source ones using the OpenStack software such as
| > Cloudwatt, DreamCompute, eNocloud, HP, Rackspace and Ulticloud, and even
| > if I encrypt every file I store there?  I am not using the cloud yet but
| > am thinking of doing so.
| >
| 
| I suppose that one way to think about it is that if you use virtualization,
| then you make
| it very easy for nefarious people to make a copy of your environment to use
| for whatever
| their nefarious purposes were.
| 
| That is a difference between using a VPS and a "real" server.

| But perhaps I'm reading too much into what Hugh said.  Alas, the term
| "cloud" has nearly as many differing meanings as does the term "cluster."


My comment was an easy, off-hand, imprecise one.  Kind of the
opposite of the long article I was pointing at.

Any third party can be compromised (by state actors or otherwise)
in a way that you are unaware of.  If you have physical control
of the hardware, it at least makes it theoretically possible that
you become aware when your system is compromised.

I said that carefully, but may still have it wrong.

End-to-end crypto (encryption AND authentication) is the only way to
eliminate certain vulnerabilities.  If one end is in the cloud (i.e.
outside your physical control), Man In The Middle attacks become
possible.

Nothing is a sure thing, but some vulnerabilities are obvious.
Using the cloud is one that has always been obviously problematic
but we've been in denial.  The NSA revelations make denial less
easy, but I'm sure we'll manage to rebuild our false confidence
because using the cloud is so cool and useful.

First step to denial: "oh, nobody would be interested in my data".
Well, the NSA scooped metadata of ALL calls.

There is theoretical work on computing on data while it is
encrypted.  In theory that would make the cloud safe.  It is
theoretically limited and currently quite impractical as far as I
know.  Fun theory though.

And don't forget traffic analysis: that requires access to the
"control plane" of the data streams, but not the actual content.  This
is what they are calling "metadata".  It is a tremendously and
surprisingly powerful technique.  More reason to keep your flows
in-house.

Oh, and another thing: security is much harder in complex systems than
simple ones.  A long security border is much harder to be sure of than
a short one.  I think that using the cloud forces a fairly wide border.

If you really want strong security, you may need an air-gap between
your system and the internet.  For example, anyone seriously creating
certificates surely has such an air-gap.  I wonder about DigiNotar.

Nothing is a sure thing.  Outsourcing IT may well be as insecure as
the cloud.  Even hiring employees rather than doing the work yourself
is a little risky.  So this isn't a simple black and white choice.
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