Catalog of NSA compromised equipments
Bob Jonkman
bjonkman-w5ExpX8uLjYAvxtiuMwx3w at public.gmane.org
Tue Dec 31 20:15:01 UTC 2013
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James Knott wrote:
> How does a hard drive communicate anything back to the NSA?
Digimer wrote:
> It doesn't work that way. It works by, for example, knowing when
> /etc/shadow is being read and modifying/injecting data into the
> stream[...]
Time to re-read "Reflections on Trusting Trust" by Ken Thompson. He
writes: "A well installed microcode bug will be almost impossible to
detect."
http://cm.bell-labs.com/who/ken/trust.html
- --Bob.
On 13-12-30 11:46 PM, Digimer wrote:
> On 30/12/13 09:20 PM, James Knott wrote:
>> William Muriithi wrote:
>>>
>>> Another program attacks the firmware in hard drives
>>> manufactured by Western Digital, Seagate, Maxtor and Samsung,
>>> all of which, with the exception of latter, are American
>>> companies. Here, too, it appears the US intelligence agency is
>>> compromising the technology and products of American
>>> companies.
>>>
>>
>> One would assume they want to collect info. How does a hard
>> drive communicate anything back to the NSA? That would require
>> the drive to send the data via the SATA port, through the IP
>> stack and then out the NIC. How is that possible?
>
> It doesn't work that way. It works by, for example, knowing when
> /etc/shadow is being read and modifying/injecting data into the
> stream that would allow an attacker to log into a target system.
> You'll note that specific support for ext2/3 FS were listed (and
> that was some years ago, so no reason not to think ext4 is also
> vulnerable).
>
> At the end of the day, if an attacker has access to your BIOS, you
> have no privacy, OS aside.
>
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