What is the best file encryption for linux?

[Marcelo Cavalcante]

>
> Very true. There is 9 to 1 chance your thief will be a Windows guy and
> hence likely to get confused and restart the system.
>
> Actually this make me wonder, doesn't this mean the system is unprotected
> when in suspend mode?
> William
>

Well, the only thing You'll have to protect you in this case is your
password.

If your password isn't something like 123456, you'll probably have a simple
security, but enough to keep your files protected from 99% of the thiefs,
who wouldn't have enough knowledge to break into it.

===================================================

Marcelo Cavalcante Rocha - Kalib

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On Thu, Jul 19, 2012 at 4:06 PM, William Muriithi <
william.muriithi-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w at public.gmane.org> wrote:

>
> >
> > As others have said, I'm aware of 2 kinds:
> >     1. cryptsetup -- block layer under the filesystem
> >     2. ecryptfs -- kernel module mounted on top of directory
> > Both will be transparent while mounted, so probably the easiest to use.
> > If your thief steals it while turned on, then all bets are off. :-)
> > --
>
> Very true. There is 9 to 1 chance your thief will be a Windows guy and
> hence likely to get confused and restart the system.
>
> Actually this make me wonder, doesn't this mean the system is unprotected
> when in suspend mode?
>
> William
> > William
> >
> > On Wed, Jul 18, 2012 at 11:19:11AM -0400, Walter Dnes wrote:
> > >   I plan do some travelling and take along my netbook or laptop, I want
> > > to be able to download+send email.  Web UI sucks.  I vastly prefer
> > > downloading via "getmail".  The problem is that getmail's rc files have
> > > userid+password in plain text for each account.  The risks of losing
> the
> > > netbook/laptop are obvious.
> > >
> > >   What I'm thinking of doing is something like so...
> > >
> > > - instead of actual rc files in ~/.getmail, have symlinks pointing to
> > >   non-existant files in /dev/shm (pseudo ramdrive)
> > >
> > > - the email retrival script would
> > >   - decrypt the rc files onto /dev/shm (after asking for a passphrase).
> > >     This would make the symlinks in ~/.getmail valid
> > >   - download email, using the symlinked rc files in ~/.getmail
> > >   - and then immediately delete the real rc files in /dev/shm
> > >
> > >   The symlinks in ~/.getmail would again be pointing to non-existant
> > > files.  Does this sound feasable, and what encryption program should I
> > > use?
> > --
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>
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