physical security in server farms

Dave Cramer davec-zxk95TxsVYDyHADnj0MGvQC/G2K4zDHf at public.gmane.org
Mon Dec 20 20:24:52 UTC 2010


On Mon, Dec 20, 2010 at 3:13 PM, Christopher Browne <cbbrowne-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w at public.gmane.org> wrote:
> On Mon, Dec 20, 2010 at 2:23 PM, Dave Cramer <davec-zxk95TxsVYDyHADnj0MGvQC/G2K4zDHf at public.gmane.org> wrote:
>> The company I work for can RFID a server. We can put the chip inside
>> the server and read it from the outside. Can anyone see a rational
>> benefit to doing this other than physical security such as being able
>> to tell that someone is walking out the door with a server ?
>
> It's a meaningful "physical security" measure if you're running some
> sort of "active polling" of RFID tags throughout the environment, so
> that you detect any movement of the tag within that environment.
>
That is essentially what our technology does.

> Thus, if there are RFID scanners:
>  - In each rack
>  - In the door to the server room
>  - At each exit to the building

Very good insight.

>
> then, if you're actively scanning the tags, you can notice any time
> the tag, and hence the device attached to it, transitions from
> location to location.
>
> It's obviously not perfect security - someone might deactivate
> scanners, or remove tags from devices.
>
> More importantly, you need to have active scanning going on
> continually, and if the server room belongs to someone else, they're
> liable to refuse to allow that.

the organizations asking for this would be able to mandate it. I'll
give you a hint "Security Theatre"

Dave
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